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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
POLICY REASONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM TO
PROMOTE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF THE
CHRISTIE DECISION

This article argues that it is highly undesirable that legal costs impede, and
often preclude access to counsel. Even if access to counsel is not a
constitutional right in itself, as the Supreme Court of Canada held in Christie,
the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie when supplemented by
other considerations, establish the importance of access to counsel as a matter
of policy. As such, the law societies and the governments of Canada ought to
do more to promote access to counsel. Specifically, the law societies ought to
reduce market-entry and market-conduct restrictions and increase the use of
existing means; the federal and provincial governments ought to increase
funding, provide for litigation insurance, and establish independent bodies to
regulate paralegals and lawyers. This article explores the current dispute
resolution regime in Canada and proposes a new approach to the way justice
is viewed.

I
INTRODUCTION
The costs of litigation, by way of fees and taxes, impede and
sometimes even preclude access to justice to such an extent that a
fundamental re-examination of how the government and the law
societies fail to allow for access to the justice system is needed. The
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Christie v. British
Columbia [Christie]1 brought the problem into stark relief. This paper
will argue that it is highly undesirable how legal costs impede, and
sometimes even preclude, access to counsel. If access to counsel is not
a constitutional right in itself as the Supreme Court of Canada held in
Christie, the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie establish

1

2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 528 [Christie].
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the importance of the right to counsel as a matter of policy such that
the law societies and the governments of Canada ought to do more to
promote access to counsel.
To make this argument this paper is organized in the
following manner: Firstly, this paper will argue that the right to
counsel is essential to access to justice and as such, to the rule of law.
This argument was advanced by the plaintiff in the Christie case and
is reinforced by a consideration of Dyzenhaus’ publicity condition of
the rule of law. 2 To deny this condition would result in a denial of the
public character of the law and the fundamental premise of the
adversarial system. This denial would also support a tenuous
distinction between the process and substance of the law as well the
illusory distinction between positive and negative rights. Denying
that access to counsel is fundamental to access to justice is tantamount
to an abandonment of the principles of the rule of law. Secondly, this
paper will suggest that the right to counsel is a constitutional right in
itself with reference to the B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney
General) [BCGEU]3 as well as s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter. The force
of these arguments grounds a right to counsel, if not as a matter of
constitutional necessity, then at least as a matter of policy.
This paper will suggest that the law societies of Canada and
the governments of Canada ought to do more to enhance access to
counsel. A precondition to this argument is to present the alleged
rationales for the existing regulatory structure that can be considered
causes of high legal costs. The specific recommendations put forth in
this paper are that the law societies ought to reduce market-entry
barriers, decrease the duration of legal training and articling, facilitate
mobility among legal professionals in Canada, and allow for the use of
alternatives to lawyers. The law societies should also reduce marketconduct restrictions by removing suggested or mandatory fees for
professional services, removing advertising restrictions, and removing
some of the restrictions on business structure. Finally, the law
societies should encourage the use of existing mechanisms—such as
contingency fees and alternative dispute resolution—that increase
access to counsel. Finally, the government ought to enhance access to
2

See David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation,
and the Apartheid Legal Order, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003).
3
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 at para. 25, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [BCGEU]
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counsel by removing any taxes on legal services, increasing the
funding for the legal system, establishing an independent body
separate from the law societies to regulate paralegals, establishing a
no-fault/no-tort accident compensation insurance scheme, providing
litigation insurance, and requiring the law society to reform in the
ways listed.
In the interests of according the greatest attention and analysis
to the issue of the right to counsel and its bearing on access to justice
issues, this paper will be unable to address broader access to justice
issues.4 Further, this paper simply points out that some combination of
the above-mentioned recommendations would improve access to
counsel, leaving the precise combination required undetermined, as
that is beyond the scope of this paper. The effectiveness of the plain
language movement, greater provision of free legal information, and
any move to increase the number of students admitted to law school
for the purpose of increasing access to justice shall also be left to
future research.

II
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS AN ASPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW
A. ENDORSEMENT OF ARGUMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE
PLAINTIFF IN THE CHRISTIE CASE

The Supreme Court of Canada held in Christie that the right
to counsel is not constitutionally protected as an aspect of the rule of
law. However, the arguments advanced in Christie on behalf of the
plaintiff were strong enough to establish that as a matter of policy

Of course there are many differing ways in which access to justice is now
understood. Rod MacDonald views access to justice in the sense of access to courts
and to counsel as characterizing the first of five “waves” in the access to justice
movement. Subsequent initiatives to promote access to justice have focused on
institutional design, demystifying the law, enhancing preventative law, and providing
for proactive access to justice. Roderick A. MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada
Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions” in Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart and Frederick H.
Zemans, eds., Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: The
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 20.

4
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better protection ought to be afforded to this right. In the Christie
decision the court conceded the fundamental importance of the rule
of law, and further conceded that access to counsel can be an
important aspect of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Court asserted
that the historical record, jurisprudence and constitutional text failed
to confer an entitlement to counsel as a general constitutional right.
This paper will examine the soundness of these arguments with
respect to whether or not the right to counsel should be a right as a
matter of policy, if not as a matter of constitutional necessity
It is not obvious from the mere fact that the right to counsel
has historically been denied that it therefore follows that the right to
counsel is not a right since the fact that a society has failed to live up
to certain ideals does not denigrate the importance of those ideals.
While s. 15 claims require historical background to establish
discrimination, simply because history suggests that no right exists
does not mean that the modern conception of justice does not require
access to counsel. One must consider that an argument that appeals to
the status quo in order to justify the status quo is unpersuasive by
virtue of being entirely circular. From a policy standpoint, it is
evident that the historical record is not of over-riding persuasive
force, given the numerous injustices that have been permitted to
occur in the past. So the mere fact that something is supported by
historical practice is not of overwhelming prescriptive value.
This paper seeks to analyze the Christie decision on policy
grounds. However, it should be noted that there is judicial precedent
that would appear to constitutionalize the right to counsel. As such,
this jurisprudence shall be dealt with in the next section when this
paper examines the extent to which the right to counsel is a
constitutional right in and of itself.
After examining the constitutional text itself, the Supreme
Court found that the rule of law does not encompass a constitutional
right to counsel. While deference must be given to the Supreme
Court’s decision, the argument put forth by Mr. Christie is still
persuasive enough to be taken seriously on policy grounds. Firstly, the
court recognizes that the Constitution expressly recognizes the right
to counsel “on arrest or detention” but states that it would be
redundant for the drafters of the Constitution to have included this
provision under s. 10b if there were a general right to access to
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counsel in any and all cases.5 This interpretation relies upon the
assumption that the drafters were meticulous in their drafting and
would not want to waste words were it possible to avoid doing so.
Alternatively, it is possible that this section is there for emphasis, in
view of its particular importance in the criminal context, and
therefore worthy of explicit recognition. That being said, such a
determination would not preclude a determination that the right to
counsel is inherent in the Charter or the rule of law. This point can be
elucidated by way of example, namely, the Charter fails to recognize
the right to privacy in express terms, yet it has come to be understood
as a nascent right in cases such as R. v. O’Connor .6
The Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of the rule of
law should include access to counsel. While it is true that “(t)he rule
of law is one of the most evocative of those animating principles—on
a par with federalism and democracy, an independent judiciary,
respect for minorities and the protection of the most vulnerable of our
society,”7 the Supreme Court of Canada feels that the rule of law only
encompasses three principles. Firstly, the rule of law implies that the
law is supreme.8 Secondly, the rule of law requires the creation and
maintenance of an actual order of positive laws.9 Finally, the
relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated
by law.10 This paper will attempt to show that the rule of law must
include access to counsel; any other definition of the rule of law is
underinclusive.
The right to counsel is inherent in the concept of access to
justice, which in turn is inherent in the rule of law. The first point,
that access to the courts is inherent to the rule of law is necessary for
5
6

Christie, supra note 1 at paras. 23-25.
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235.

Warren J. Newman, “The Principles of the Rule of Law and Parliamentary
Sovereignty in Constitutional Theory and Litigation” (2005) 16 Nat’l J. Const. L. 175
at 176 [Newman, “Rule of Law”].

7

Reference re: Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of
Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] S.C.R. 721 at para. 64-68, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1.

8

9

Ibid.

Reference re: Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385; British
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, 257 D.L.R. (4th)

10

193.
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the term ‘law’ to be meaningful and is discernible from the three
principles of the rule of law. According to the first principle of the
rule of law—that the law is supreme—access to the courts is implied;
if there were no access to the courts then the rule-making body would
be supreme rather than the law. According to the second principle—
that there be the creation and maintenance of an actual order of
positive laws—access to the courts is required in order for the term
‘law’, as opposed to the arbitrary dictates of the rule-making body, to
be meaningful. Finally, the third principle—that the relationship
between the state and the individual be regulated by law—also
requires that there be access to the courts since the alternative would
imply regulation by fiat rather than law. By depriving citizens of
access to the courts, rulers could simply pass whatever arbitrary laws
they desired, break them as they saw fit, and thereby ensure that the
relationship between sovereign and subject could not realistically be
said to be regulated, or, if so, would be regulated by whim more so
than law.
The rule of law is a process whereby laws can be seen as
‘legitimate’ and ‘regular’11 rather than ‘arbitrary’.12 This necessitates
access to the courts.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Christie seemed to be willing
to accept the idea that access to the courts was inherent in the rule of
law.13 The court also did not disavow the judgment passed in BCGEU.
In BCGEU, the Supreme Court found that “(t) here cannot be a rule of
law without access, otherwise the rule of law is replaced by a rule of
men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have access to
justice.”14 In BCGEU it was also held that:
“(i)t would be inconceivable that Parliament and the
provinces should describe in such detail the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and should not first

Arbitrariness is the antithesis of regularity and regularity is presupposed in the rule
of law. See generally A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1959) at 185 – 193.

11

This is Griffiths distinction between “legitimacy” and “arbitrariness.” J A G Griffith,
“The Common Law and the Political Constitution” (2001) 17 LQR 42 at 46.

12

13

Christie, supra note 1.

14

BCGEU, supra note 3.
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protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit
from such guarantees, that is, access to a court.”15

The court continues to make the claim more forcefully, stating:
“Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter if a person is denied or delayed access to a court of
competent jurisdiction in order to vindicate them? How can
the courts independently maintain the rule of law and
effectively discharge the duties imposed by the Charter if
court access is hindered, impeded or denied? The Charter
protections would become merely illusory, the entire Charter
undermined.”16

Nevertheless, because so many people represent themselves in court,
the Supreme Court was of the view that a denial of the right to
counsel did not impair access to counsel. The Supreme Court may
have been sympathetic to the idea, as argued by the Crown, that to
read a right to counsel into the unwritten principle of the rule of law,
would be to make the rule of law into more than it is and to demean
the importance of actual constitutional principles. On this point,
Warren J. Newman states:
“The principle of the rule of law, pivotal though it is as a
basic value (some might well claim the grand norm) of the
Canadian constitutional system, should not be assumed to
operate in the same manner, or with the same direct legal
force, as a provision of the Constitution of Canada. Whilst
the rule of law can be invoked in furtherance of the
interpretation and application of constitutional provisions,
and can thereby influence—sometimes profoundly—the
response as to whether a given statute or regulation is
consistent with the terms of the Constitution, the courts
should not, in my view, attempt to use the rule-of-law
principle independently to invalidate such legislation.”17

15

Ibid at para. 24.

16

Ibid.

17

Newman, “Rule of Law”, supra note 7 at 186.
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This view is unconvincing. The rule of law is required to
ensure that the Constitution is respected, as maintained in BCGEU.
Therefore, the rule of law necessarily governs the interpretation of
the Charter itself. The fact that this makes the rule of law quite
important is not an objection to this argument. If it is necessary (as it
is) for the rule of law to be interpreted quite expansively in order to
make sense of the Constitution itself, then so be it. There is no
alternative. Access to the courts, in turn, is required for the rule of
law to make sense, as previously articulated, and therefore no limits
are imposed on mere access. However, access to counsel is required
for the law to be properly understood, otherwise this access is simply
illusory. In light of the complexity of the law, granting mere access
without the right to counsel is relatively meaningless in the same way
that granting mere access if the law were written in another language
would be meaningless. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s view in
Christie is mistaken because the right to counsel is inherent in the
rule of law, since the right to counsel is integral to meaningful access
to the courts. To say otherwise would be to grant an empty right, akin
to granting the right to an all-you-can-eat restaurant devoid of food.
More eloquently, the Canadian Bar Association stated that “without
legal aid, access to justice is a hollow phrase, as many people simply
cannot take advantage of their legal rights.”18 The rule of law is the
very basis of a democracy, and presupposes meaningful access to the
courts, which implies the right to counsel. Without the rule of law,
the constitution itself would make little sense. The fact that the right
to counsel is inherent in the notion of access to the courts, is evident
from the complexity of the law, a point made clear by Dyzenhaus.

B. DYZENHAUS’ PUBLICITY CONDITION OF THE RULE OF LAW
IMPLIES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Dyzenhaus finds two unwritten characteristics of the rule of
law. Firstly, he finds what he refers to as the “publicity condition of
law”, which is the idea that it is “inherent in the notion of substituting
Canadian Bar Association, News Release, “CBA Announces Legal Team to Lead
Court Challenge on Constitutional Right to Legal Aid” (19 February 2005), online:
<Canadian Bar Association http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/2005_Releases/2005-0219_lacounsel.aspx>.

18
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or replacing arbitrary measures with legal rules that the rules be
known....”19 He goes on to state that, secondly, “it is implicit in the
notion of the Rule of Law that the state’s obligation is not one of
merely disclosing the law, but rather one of disclosing the law in a
fashion which makes it accessible to the individual....”20 This
apparently involves positive assistance from the state since “...the fact
that many citizens cannot, without the state’s assistance, respond to or
cope with that law suggests the Rule of Law will be undermined if
that assistance is not forthcoming.”21 Dyzenhaus’ contention is wellfounded. It is apparent that if it were a satisfactory solution to
represent oneself in court, many more people would be taking
advantage of this option rather than expending tens of thousands of
dollars on legal fees. Unfortunately, self-representation is not a
satisfactory solution. Indeed, the complexity and seriousness of a case
may require access to counsel in order for the accused to receive a fair
trial.22 The legal profession cannot `have their cake and eat it too’,
either the law is complex and lawyers are necessary, or it is not, and as
such, there is no need for lawyers. Clearly, the legal system feels that
there is a need for lawyers, and so the complexity of the legal system
must be conceded, and with that comes an admission that the right to
counsel must be afforded protection.

C. TO DENY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE TO DENY THE PUBLIC CHARACTER
OF THE LAW
The right to counsel is also apparent in light of a consideration
of the public character of the law. The court has found the existence
of a right to counsel in cases where the state is attempting to use its
coercive power to infringe upon the liberty interests of an accused.
However, there is no principled distinction for providing the right to

Canada, McCamus Commission, Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review : A
Blueprint for Publicly Funded Legal Services (Toronto: Queen`s Printer, 1997)

19

(Chair, John D. McCamus) at 67-74 [McCamus, “Blueprint for Legal Services”].
20

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

Anne-Marie Langan, “Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice:
Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Courts of Ontario" (2005) 30 Queens L.J. 825 at
844 [Langan, “Scales of Justice”].
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counsel in criminal cases but not in civil cases. Punitive or criminal
penalties are not necessarily much more damaging than pecuniary or
civil penalties. Both are extremely important to our existence as
individuals.
Firstly, the distinction between criminal and civil trials cannot
rely on the fact that in criminal cases the state is directly involved in
prosecuting the accused, whereas in civil cases the state is not directly
involved. Such a formulation of the principle runs counter to the
realities of society. The government or state is frequently involved in
civil disputes and, more often than not, is the target of lawsuits. More
importantly, even if it is not directly involved as a litigant, its
involvement is still immense. This latter point is evident from an
attention to the public character of the law. The state regulates all
civil lawsuit activity. Moreover, as Owen Fiss has made clear, the
regulation and implementation of the law is paid for with public funds
in order to govern all of society.23 Therefore, it is not legitimate to
simply let people purchase as much or as little justice as they are able
to afford. Justice is not a private good available to the highest bidder.
It is a public good necessary for the preservation of a free and
democratic society.24
Secondly, the proposed distinction cannot rely on the fact that
in criminal cases the accused’s liberty interests are at stake whereas in
civil lawsuits they are not. The problem with drawing this distinction
is apparent by noting how a person’s liberty can be more adversely
affected by a landlord-tenant dispute, an immigration hearing, an
appeal for Ontario Works, CPP or OSDB or a suit in torts, than it is in
a criminal matter.25 As was argued in the Report of the Ontario Legal
Aid Review:

Owen Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073 at 1085 [Fiss, “Against
Settlement”].

23

24 Admittedly, in economics terms, justice could be conceived of as something other
than a public good, in the sense of being excludable but that would distort the
meaning of justice beyond recognition. The other characteristic of a private good is
whether or not it is rival. Justice is not rival since by its very nature justice for one
must be justice for all. If it were not, it would not be justice.
25

McCamus, “Blueprint for Legal Services”, supra note 19 at 67-74.
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“it is not difficult to imagine cases involving no risk of
incarceration in which the claim for legal aid appears
stronger than in some kinds of cases involving that risk.
Thus, a young adult charged with a first offence who has
difficulty communicating and for whom a conviction might
result in a loss of employment and other negative
consequences that may flow from acquiring a criminal
record may appear to make a stronger claim for legal aid
than someone who has been convicted several times before,
faces an overwhelming and uncomplicated case, is able to
communicate and is knowledgeable about the justice
system, and risks only a short period of incarceration about
which he or she is not particularly troubled.”26

In addition, this report points out other instances in which liberty
interests are at stake outside of the criminal context, such as refugee
hearings, involuntary civil commitment of a psychiatric patient,
family law disputes, and so on.27 Therefore, a consideration of the
public character of the law reveals that the provision of legal counsel
in criminal matters but not in civil matters cannot be maintained by
appealing solely to the role of the state, since the state is intimately
involved in civil trials. Further, the liberty interests at stake in civil
trials can sometimes be jeopardized to an even greater extent. There is
no principled reason to provide for the right to counsel only in
criminal cases. As such, it is evident that, on policy grounds, the right
to counsel ought to be afforded greater protection.

D. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE OF
THE LAW IS TENUOUS
The right to counsel must also be considered in light of the
evolving common law.28 The Supreme Court of Canada held in
Christie that there is a defensible distinction between the process and
the substance of the law: the right to counsel is a procedural right that
does not have constitutional status; the rule of law relates only to the

26
27

Ibid.
Ibid.

Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Privatizing Our Public Civil Justice System” (2006) 9 News &
Views on Civil Justice Reform 16 at 16 [Farrow, “Privatizing”].

28
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substantive content of the law.29 This view is unfortunate given that
the rules of civil procedure, for example, are designed to facilitate the
function, fairness, and equality of the law. Without proper adherence
to and the full utilization of proscribed legal procedure, courts would
be unable to produce well-reasoned and considered legal opinions.
Without these well-reasoned opinions, the foundations of precedent
would falter and result in the loss of confidence in the judicial system.
It logically follows that the rule of law cannot be separated out from
procedural fairness. Further, the common law is formed and advanced
through judicial precedent. If landmark cases like Donoghue v.
Stevenson had never been heard, then one might not have modern
tort law.30 Therefore, the process of the law generates the substance of
the law and so the two cannot be separated.

E. THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM PRESUPPOSES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The importance of the right to counsel is evident from a
consideration of the nature of the adversarial system. Underpinning
the adversarial system itself is the idea that through the use of an
adversarial system, justice is best achieved. Given the complexity of
the law, experts in the law are needed. Thus, the adversarial system
presupposes rough equality in professional standards and knowledge
as between the parties engaged in the dispute; if this were not the case
then it is difficult to see how justice could best be served by an
adversarial system. However, a dispute in which one party is
unrepresented upsets the balance of the system31 and will likely end
up being unfair to the unrepresented litigant.32 A survey of
unrepresented litigants conducted by Anne-Marie Langan revealed
that they were significantly disadvantaged by this situation, having
“difficulties drafting their own pleadings and filling out court forms,
understanding court procedures and negotiating with opposing
29

Christie, supra note 1.

Andrew Pirie, “Critiques of Settlement Advocacy” in Colleen Hanycz, Trevor
Farrow & Frederick Zemans, eds. The Theory and Practice of Representative
Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) 278 [Pirie, “Settlement
Advocacy”].

30

31

Langan, “Scales of Justice”, supra note 22 at 828.

32

Ibid. at 839-40.
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counsel.”33 Further, judges and court staff are often frustrated by the
lack of knowledge of civil procedure and legal arguments on the part
of the unrepresented litigant. 34 The right to counsel is important
insofar as we believe in the value and efficacy of an adversarial
system.
A judge may attempt to rectify this inequity by providing assistance to
the unrepresented party. This action would help preserve the
integrity of the adversarial system insofar as the parties’ advocacy
power would be roughly equal. However, the adversarial system only
functions properly if it is governed by a neutral arbiter who decides
between the two parties. Consequently, the independence of the
judge is immediately drawn into question if the judge assists the
unrepresented party. In essence, it is unfair to the opposing counsel35
when a judge provides assistance to an unrepresented party.36 An
unrepresented party draws into question the utility of the adversarial
system itself. Justice, in a modern adversarial system, is best served by
each party having access to counsel who can understand the law and
advance the best interests of the client.

F. DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS IS
ILLUSORY
The resistance to the provision of counsel may be founded in
the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights.
Unfortunately for the proponents of this view, this distinction is
illusory. The traditional distinction between positive and negative
rights holds that negative rights are pre-governmental rights—which
are rights possessed prior to the institution of government—37 that are
costless38 since they merely protect individuals from governmental
33

Ibid. at 843-44.

34

Ibid. at 829.

35

Ibid. at 841-43.

36

Ibid.

John Hasnas, "Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights” (2005) 22 Social
Philosophy and Policy 111 at112 [Hasnas, “Theory”].

37

See e.g. Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi Press,
2000) [Ignatieff, “Rights Revolution”]. Michael Ignatieff’s work although concerned
exclusively with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, fails to make any
38

48

action, and are not protections afforded by the government.39
Consequently, it has been thought that “(t)raditionally, the
protections of the Constitution have been viewed largely as
prohibition constraints on the power of government, rather than
affirmative duties with which government must comply.”40 On this
view, the government has no obligation to do anything,41 but if it
chooses to act, it must merely “refrain from acts that deprive citizens
of protected rights”.42
Conversely, positive rights are thought to be postgovernmental rights that arise after the institution of government and
that cost money by requiring affirmative action on the part of the
government43 to act, provide, or protect.44 So it has been that in
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), it was stated that “there is no
constitutional right to protective legislation per se.”45 In Gosselin v.
Quebec (Attorney General) it was found that “s.7 speaks of the right
not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” and that
“(n)othing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life,
liberty or security of the person.”46 As a result, the court found the
government under no positive obligation to help citizens, although
they did leave open the possibility that such a duty may occur in the
future, depending upon the case in question.47 Similarly, in Vriend v.
mention of the cost of our negative rights, almost as if to say that it is costless to
protect rights.
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Alberta, the Court noted that positive obligations had not yet been
found, (although the Court left open the possibility that positive
obligations could be found in the future).48 In Christie the court was
wary of the cost that would stem from recognizing a general right to
counsel. They pointed out that the “fiscal implications of the right
sought cannot be denied. What is being sought is not a small,
incremental change in the delivery of legal services. It is a huge
change that would alter the legal landscape and impose a not
inconsiderable burden on taxpayers.”49 Unfortunately, rather than
supporting the distinction between positive and negative rights, cost
considerations eradicate that distinction.
An analysis of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms shows,
firstly, that many of the rights contained therein are positive even in
the traditional sense, in that they are not pre-governmental and they
require affirmative state action and therefore cost money. The legal
rights protected under ss. 7 to 14 of the Charter, in some instances,
demand affirmative action: s. 10 provides for the right to counsel
when one has been arrested, s. 11 imposes the duty on police officers
to supply information, s.14 requires the government to provide the
assistance of an interpreter where warranted, and s. 1050 further
imposes obligations on the government to ensure that a fair hearing
transpires.51 Moreover, affirmative action by the state is mandated by
the protections afforded to Canada’s official languages under ss. 16 to
22 to take affirmative action in certain instances to ensure that both
official languages are maintained in Canada.52 This is also true of the
protections under s. 23 governing minority language educational
rights. The democratic rights protected under ss. 3 to 5 of the Charter
require affirmative action by the government in the sense that it must
hold elections.
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Most importantly, the remaining Charter rights as well as
non-Charter rights under s. 26 of the Charter despite being considered
to be ‘negative’ rights according to a traditional analysis, are actually
identical to positive rights. This is the case because all negative rights,
to be meaningful, are positive in the sense that they can only be
enjoyed after the institution of government. That negative rights
require state action is expressly recognized under s. 24 of the Charter
which mandates that all of the rights contained therein be enforced.53
For instance, the right to vote requires the provision of voting booths,
the right to a trial by a jury requires a criminal justice system and so
forth.54 As such, they are not pre-governmental, but are political
rights, requiring substantial affirmative state action and therefore,
state funding. The extent to which someone can enjoy a negative right
is largely contingent upon the amount of money allocated to law
enforcement, the judiciary, the criminal justice system and the various
ministries that allow for the enjoyment of the right in question,55
whether that be via providing deposit insurance, fire protection,
assigning property rights, providing benefits to the populace at large
in order to secure the requisite social solidarity of the populace, or
other, more subtle means.
In order to elucidate the point of this section, it may be of
assistance to consider one of the archetypal negative rights, as
traditionally defined, namely, the right to private property. This right
is enshrined in the American constitution and, like the right to
privacy, is implied in the Canadian constitution. Moreover, it is
recognized under s. 26 of the Charter which affirms all pre-existing
rights, such as the right to property as recognized according to statute,
by virtue of registration, and common law principles. This right is
identical to most positive rights since it is not pre-governmental,
requires affirmative state action56 and therefore requires state funding.
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Firstly, this right requires affirmative state action. The government
must define, assign,57 interpret and enforce this right.58 As David
Currie has pointed out “property, like contract, entails a right against
third parties that is worthless without government help.”59 Without
these actions this right would be meaningless. Most obviously police,
fire departments, courts and prisons have to be paid for.60 Less
obviously, this right may require the provision of benefits to those
without property so as to ensure the continued compliance of the
citizenry in respecting this right as well as the requisite maintenance
of social cohesion so as to preserve confidence in the future, without
which this right is meaningless.61 The preceding example highlights
the fact that while rights protect citizens from the government, they
also require governmental action to prevent, punish and deter
nefarious actions taken by their fellow citizens. In this way, rights
cannot be achieved simply by placing restrictions on what the
government can do. In reality, they require action by the government.
But all of these actions require funds and so these affirmative actions
on the part of the state require funding.
It should therefore be evident that there is nothing pregovernmental about negative rights. The government as a whole is
necessary in order to ensure that the citizenry can exercise their
rights, since the government affords the citizenry with the necessary
preconditions for the enjoyment of their rights. Absent the police,
army, fire department, Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation and
poverty reduction programs, to name but a smattering of
governmental programs, then a Hobbesian state of affairs is all too
likely to develop.62 Citizens would have little without the
government;63 at best they would develop some sort of collective,
defense-providing type of system. We would not all be “Robinson
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Crusoe’s” on our own separate islands. Instead, we would still live
with or near other people, but it is more plausible that in the absence
of government, life would be “nasty, brutish and short.”64 All of the
aforementioned services are provided by the government.
Furthermore, they are unlikely to be provided by the private sector
owing to the free-rider problem.65 So the notion that any right is
costless is difficult to defend. At a minimum, rights must be enforced
by the government since “the value of rights…directly depends on the
availability of effective instruments for remedying violations of those
rights.”66 Finally, in order for any right to exist all of the various
branches of government have to be called upon in order to secure the
necessary social cooperation to ensure that rights become a reality.67
To use more Marxist terminology, “it is the function of the state and
law to maintain the structure of productive relations by providing
norms and institutions which allow those relations to flourish.”68 In
fact, “even those constitutional duties which are most clearly phrased
in the negative may be enforceable only through affirmative
governmental exertions” such that “the portrayal of government as
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passive and uninvolved is sharply at odds with the reality of
government as pervasive regulator and architect of a vast web of
social, economic, and political strategies and choices.”69
An examination of the other Charter rights, and those
protected under s. 26 of the Charter reveals how they too are actually
positive rights, even if they have been traditionally understood as
negative in nature. Briefly, they all require enforcement, and, in
particular, s. 3 requires the expenditure of funds to hold an election, s.
10 requires expenditure to ensure a fair hearing. More subtly, s. 2
rights may require the government to afford protection of these
rights. Importantly, s.7 and s. 15, on a natural reading would appear to
protect positive rights, a contention that shall be addressed in a
subsequent section of this essay. It is evident then that the Charter
already affords protection to numerous positive rights, and that
therefore, the right to counsel cannot be objected to based on the
fictitious belief that the Constitution only protects negative rights,
contra the majority’s view of the role of the Constitution as
exemplified in Hunter v. Southam.70
Therefore, the right to counsel cannot be objected to solely
because it costs money, or requires affirmative state action, or is not a
pre-governmental right. Admittedly, there are other reasons for the
neglect of positive rights. On one view ‘positive rights’ cause more
conflicts than negative rights because they have to do with the
distribution of resources. 71 The courts have been frequent objectors to
the notion that this would then immerse the court in the role of
assessing policy, which is not their core area of expertise.72 Others
object to positive rights because they are, apparently, aspirational in
nature.73 Another reason for the inattention to the cost of rights is due
to the belief that negative rights are worthy of more protection than
69
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other interests that could be framed as positive rights. 74 However,
none of these reasons are persuasive in light of an understanding of
cost considerations.
Positive rights are not more aspirational than negative rights.
All rights cost money to protect. Therefore, all rights can always be
protected to a greater extent. As a result, all rights are in a sense,
aspirational.75 With the respect to the notion that to recognize the
right to counsel would be tantamount to the court making a policy
decision, this objection is quelled by a consideration of the importance
of the right to counsel in a modern-day democracy in order for the
concepts of access to justice and the rule of law to make sense. Also,
the notion that ensuring access to justice is not an area of judicial
expertise is tenuous. Furthermore, failing to consider budgetary
choices, due to a deference to “executive privilege” is itself to make a
choice in favour of the status quo. The “slippery slope argument is that
by avoiding imposition of any affirmative duties, the judiciary can also
avoid value judgments. The argument is fatally flawed because it fails
to see the implicit value choices on which it rests and the
impossibility of avoiding the question of values.”76
Finally, the idea that negative rights, as traditionally
understood, are more worthy of protection than positive rights is odd,
since at the base of all other rights is the idea that every human being
deserves respect and fair treatment by virtue of being human.77 Yet if
all other laws are premised on this one principle, and if this one
principle is not being achieved, then this is clearly a problematic
situation. As Michael Ignatieff points out, “agency is the key idea in
rights” which means “the capacity of individuals to set themselves
goals and accomplish them as they see fit”78 yet minimal positive
rights to food, clothing and shelter are necessary to have any agency.79
In this way, negative rights are meaningless without a minimum
Jeremy Waldron, “Waldron and Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights” (2000) 29
Journal of Legal Studies 301.

74

75

Holmes & Sunstein, “Cost of Rights”, supra note 55 at 119.

76

Bandes, “A Critique”, supra note 40 at 2332-2333.

77

Ian Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989) at

1.
78
79

Ignatieff, “Rights Revolution”, supra note 38 at 23.
Hirschl, “Entitlements”, supra note 57 at 1072.

55

amount of positive freedom. Since negative rights are meaningless
without government assistance, this assistance is provided, even
though this costs money. It is plausible then that money should be
provided for positive rights since positive rights are required in order
to enjoy negative rights.80 In particular, the right to counsel cannot be
objected to solely because it is a positive right, and, most importantly,
given its importance, it should be afforded protection. Admittedly, it
could be argued that in a democracy people are entitled to demand
and receive precisely as much justice as they desire. However, despite
the strong, majoritarian appeal of this view, substantive democracy
requires a certain level of justice regardless of what individuals within
that society may want. In much the same way, democracy requires
elections regardless of whether or not the members of any particular
democracy want elections. This necessarily entails, as Professor
Farrow argues, that the importance of justice must always trump that
of efficiency.81

III
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN ITSELF
It has been argued that the right to counsel is very important and that
it is inherent to the idea of access to courts which is inherent to the
rule of law. However, it is also plausible that the right to counsel is a
constitutional right in itself.

A. THE SUPREME COURT’S REFUTATION OF BCGEU WAS LEFT
LARGELY UNARGUED

In the scant thirty paragraphs that the Supreme Court
provided in the way of a judgement in the Christie case they did not
succeed in differentiating the Christie case sufficiently from BCGEU
which recognized a constitutional right to access to the courts. The
Court reasoned in Christie that the government is entitled to pass laws
with respect to the administration of justice, such as one that levies a
tax on legal services. Yet this assertion was unargued and it is more
plausible that the opposite is true. If it were the case that the
80
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government could pass laws in relation to the administration of justice
that preclude access to justice then there would be no point in saying
that there was a right to access to justice in the first place. If there is a
constitutional right to access to justice, then clearly the government
cannot pass laws in relation to the administration of justice that
curtail that right (subject to s.1). The tax in question was not ‘in
relation to the administration of justice’ in the administrative sense (as
would be the case with a rule setting judges’ salaries, their hours of
operation, and so forth,) rather it precluded access in the case of Mr.
Christie’s clients. The tax imposed on Mr. Christie led directly to Mr.
Christie’s insolvency and the inability of his clients to receive legal
counsel. In this way, the tax was equivalent to picketing in front of a
courthouse in its effect and the Supreme Court failed to distinguish
picketing from a tax precluding access to a lawyer.

B. S. 7 GROUNDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
It has been unconvincingly argued in the past, in large part by
the courts of this country, that there is no positive duty upon the state
to provide for the basic welfare of its citizens, including ensuring that
the right to counsel is provided for. Margot Young has pointed out the
absurdity of such a position by showing that “(t)he fundamental
justifications of democracy, citizenship, individual autonomy, equality
and justice that inform why we protect what we protect as
constitutional rights are as strongly supportive of social and economic
rights as they are of civil and political rights.”82 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has not been persuaded by such arguments. For
instance, in Dunmore v. Ontario, no constitutional right to protective
legislation was found83 While in Gosselin v. Quebec it was found that
“(n)othing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life,
liberty or security of the person.”84 As a result, the court found the
government under no positive obligation to help citizens, although
they did leave open the possibility that such a duty may be found in
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the future, depending upon the case in question.85 In light of the
preceding discussion regarding the illusory distinction between
negative and positive rights, it is evident that insofar as the state is
obligated to respect negative rights, it can clearly be shown to have an
obligation to provide for positive rights as well.
Even if one were unaware of the similarity between positive
and negative rights, it is sufficient to note that a natural reading of
section 7 would appear to confer a right to counsel. This is apparent
on two possible grounds. Firstly, the first clause in section 7 grants a
right to life, liberty and security of the person, if this clause is taken to
be free-standing, as Justice Arbour had argued.86 Secondly, in light of
the public character of the law, as previously articulated, a denial of
the right to counsel is tantamount to the state depriving a person of
their life, liberty and security of the person.

C. S. 15 GROUNDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL
It must be remembered that s. 15 allows for equality under
and before the law as well as the equal protection and equal benefit of
the law.87 In order to ensure that this is the case it would seem to be
necessary to find a right to counsel, particularly in light of
considerations that have been previously mentioned, such as the
nature of the adversarial system. In addition, in Law v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), Justice Iacobucci stated
that the purpose of s. 15 is to “prevent the violation of essential
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage,
stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society
in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings
or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”88 Access to counsel
is most necessary when human dignity and freedom are threatened. It
85
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would seem to be the case then that s. 15 affords a right to counsel.
However, discrimination can only be found if the court determines
that an enumerated or analogous ground in s. 15 has been violated.
The judicial interpretation of s. 15 so far has not envisaged income as
analogous grounds of discrimination and, as such, it may appear to be
the case that it is difficult to found a s. 15-based claim for the right to
counsel.
That being said, the court could still conclude that income
should be an analogous ground of discrimination, as Faye Woodman
has argued, owing to the fact that “low-income, the lower-class, or the
underprivileged share many of the disadvantages of individuals with
enumerated characteristics. They lack political power, and may
constitute ‘discrete and insular minorities’.”89 There is at least a
plausible argument to be made that the right to counsel is a
constitutional right in itself, and as such, it should, from a policy
standpoint, be afforded greater attention.

IV
CAUSES OF HIGH LEGAL COSTS – ALLEGED RATIONALES FOR THE
EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE
It has been shown that the right to counsel is extremely
important and that the legal costs that impede that right are highly
undesirable If costs are one of the main barriers to access to the legal
system then that which lowers those costs will likely be the most
effective method of increasing access to justice. Consequently, this
paper shall presently extol the rationales underlying the selfgoverning power and independence of the Law Societies of Canada.
The rationales underlying the self-regulating power of the
Law Societies of Canada and its independence are distinct. The
general rationale underlying the regulation of lawyers is to protect
consumers and to ensure the quality of services offered to them.90 The
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general rationale underlying the self-regulation of lawyers is to
protect the independence of the judicial system itself.91
As set out in the Competition Bureau’s report,92 and supported
by the vast majority of economists,93 an efficient allocation of
resources stems from ensuring that goods are produced and purchased
in the framework of a competitive market place, except in instances of
market failure. Generally, competition serves the interests of the
consumer since “consumers have access to the broadest range of
services at the most competitive prices and that producers have the
maximum incentive to reduce their costs as much as possible and meet
consumer demand.”94
Unfortunately, private markets are not always efficient. When
they are not it is called an instance of ‘market failure’. Market failure
is when a market fails to allocate resources efficiently. The four main
types of market failure occur when a market actor is capable of
abusing market power, when externalities are present, when the good
in question is a public good, or when there is asymmetric
information.95 In such cases regulatory intervention may be able to
improve the market, but if carried out improperly, this regulation
could have an anti-competitive effect that could worsen the
situation.96 The two main sources of market failure in the provision of
legal services are information asymmetries and externalities.
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A. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
An information asymmetry occurs when there is an imbalance
of information between two or more parties. The severity of this
problem varies with the type of good that the consumer seeks to
purchase. The quality of a ‘search’ good is apparent to the eventual
consumer after it has been found, the quality of an ‘experience’ good
becomes apparent to the eventual consumer after it has been tried,
however, the eventual consumer is never fully capable of assessing the
quality of ‘credence’ goods even after having experienced them.97
Legal services are credence goods. When a consumer purchases legal
services, that consumer is unable to tell—even after having received
the legal service in question—whether or not the service was of high
quality. This owes to the information asymmetry between the two
parties. This information asymmetry, in turn, is what necessitated the
purchase of the legal service in the first place.98
Asymmetric information, in turn, can lead to the problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the tendency
for the mix of unobserved traits to become undesirable from the
perspective of the uninformed party.99 In the case of legal services it
would mean that there would be a tendency for firms to offer lower
quality services (without a corresponding decrease in the price of
those services) to their clients. They would be able to do this because
their customers are unable to ascertain the quality of the services,
because the consumers are purchasing a credence good.100 However,
since consumers are also aware of their own inability to distinguish
between high and low quality service providers, they will be
unwilling to pay for high price goods out of a fear that high quality
will not accompany that price.101 As a result, providers of the highest
quality (and highest-priced service) may exit the market, leaving an
overall pool of even lower quality service providers. This downward
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cycle on prices and quality would continue until only the lowest
quality services for the lowest price would be provided.102
Asymmetric information can also result in moral hazard
problems. Moral hazard is the tendency for people to act in their own
interests rather than those of their clients. As a result, a client may
prefer higher quality and higher cost legal services, but be provided
only with high cost services of lower quality owing to the fact that,
due to the information asymmetry, the consumer is purchasing a
credence good. Alternatively, the consumer may desire a good of
lower quality and lower cost yet the provider may still provide higher
quality and higher cost services. This could easily transpire since the
legal professional is responsible for evaluating the legal problem,
suggesting the appropriate remedy and attempting to implement it,
and therefore has a financial incentive to suggest an expensive remedy
knowing full well that the client is not in a position to question such
advice. If the client were able to properly question this advice, he or
she would not be seeking the attorney’s services.103
Regulation of the legal market can correct for the adverse
selection problem by providing market entry restrictions that ensure
the provision of high quality legal services and thereby reduce the
uncertainty about the quality of services that are paid for.104
Regulation of the legal market can also correct for the moral hazard
problem by providing market conduct restrictions by setting
maximum prices or by ensuring a minimum standard105 that prevent
legal professionals from exploiting their clients’ informational
disadvantage.106 It should be noted that these problems are less acute
for repeat users of the justice system, such as companies for whom use
of legal services may be routine.107 However, for the average person,
use of the justice system is infrequent.108 Admittedly, if a robust
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system of information transfers between past clients and prospective
clients of legal services could be implemented then this would
diminish the problems that stem from the information asymmetry
between clients and lawyers.109 However, the asymmetrical
information problems that arise from the purchase of legal services
result from the fact that the good being purchased is a credence good.
As such, the transfer of information from consumers who have
experienced the quality of this good from some suppliers will only
mitigate and not obviate the information asymmetry problem.

B. EXTERNALITIES
Externalities arise when the party purchasing a given product
does not pay the true social cost of that product. The total cost that
accrues to society may diverge from the private cost paid by the
consumer when there are externalities. There can be positive
externalities—where a benefit accrues to a third party or society at
large from the transaction in question—and negative externalities—
where a cost is imposed on a third party, or society at large owing to
the transaction in question.110 In the context of the legal system,
negative externalities can arise from low quality service, when poorly
argued or incomplete cases are presented to the courts. Such cases
result in poor quality decisions for the parties involved in the dispute.
These decisions have a negative effect on society as well owing to the
force of precedent. This, in turn, grounds the regulation of legal
service providers to ensure that these providers attain a certain
minimum standard that will protect the public at large from this
effect. Further, high-quality services can result in positive
externalities accruing to society at large in much the same as lowquality services have negative effects. For example, well-argued and
well-presented cases often result in higher-quality decisions from the
courts simply because the court is more properly informed of the
issues and the law in question.
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V
THE LAW SOCIETY SHOULD ENHANCE ACCESS TO COUNSEL: THE
EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE FAVOURS THE PROFESSION’S
INTEREST OVER THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The existing regulatory structure, in an effort to combat the
asymmetrical information and externality-based problems inherent in
the provision of legal services, has functioned, whether by intention
or in effect, too much like a cartel, enacting regulations that are in its
own interests but contrary to those of the public.111
The theoretical need for regulation is clear. Most countries
have conferred the regulatory power on the profession itself. In the
proceeding section, an analysis of the various law societies’ regulatory
effects on the legal services markets is undertaken.

A. REDUCE MARKET-ENTRY BARRIERS
Market entry restrictions have been erected to combat the adverse
selection problems stemming from the information asymmetry
between lawyers and their clients. Market entry barriers ensure that
those who enter the legal profession are of high quality, thus
preventing low quality professionals from practicing law. However, in
economic terms, the regulation that has been enacted by the law
societies of Canada appears to protect its members from competitive
forces and thereby ensure, rather than correct for, market failure. As
stated by the Competition Bureau: by “creating, enhancing or
preserving the market power of incumbents” law societies ensure a
lower supply of quality of services at higher prices than would prevail
in a competitive.112
The law societies have over-corrected for the potential
problem of low quality lawyers to the detriment of those who would
prefer to purchase service of a lower quality and also of a lower price.
Further the law societies’ regulatory efforts have resulted in some
consumers being simply unable to purchase any legal services

111

Stephen, “Paper to Scottish Parliament”, supra note 93 at 14.

112

Competition Bureau, “Self-regulated professions”, supra note 90 at 21.

64

whatsoever.113 Such barriers protect incumbents and insulate them
from outside competitive pressures, further lessening the quality of
service.114 This is of benefit primarily to current lawyers and is not in
the interest of the populace.
It is true that regulation ensures that the market will not fail,
but the law societies have made excessive use of the regulatory
methods available with severe consequences for access to counsel.
This paper endorses the findings of the Competition Bureau:
“jurisdictions that maintain higher standards than others should look
to the outcomes of less regulated jurisdictions when defining the
minimum necessary level of qualification.”115

1. DECREASE DURATION OF LEGAL TRAINING AND ARTICLING
A barrier to entry employed by the law societies is the
onerous legal training and articling required to become a lawyer.
Lawyers in Canada must have completed at least two years of
undergraduate education (although most have completed their
Bachelor’s degree), a three year common law degree, (or, in Quebec, a
civil law degree) and the bar admission course of the province in
which the wish to practice.116
The rationale for these standards is to ensure that lawyers are
of high quality. However, if the goal of this exercise is to have high
quality lawyers then that can be achieved through allowing law
students to pursue optional additional accreditation. It does not make
any sense to force all law students to complete all of the above
requirements since it thereby forces all prospective buyers to buy
legal services of a certain quality, with no regard for their own
interests and preferences. Unless the law societies can demonstrate by
more than simple assertion that these standards are the absolute
minimum that are required in the public interest, then the duration of
this accreditation process must be reduced. A reduced accreditation
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period will decrease the salaries of lawyers and thereby increase
access to justice. Such a development is in the public interest.
Firstly, it seems unlikely that the three years it takes
to acquire a law degree are necessary in light of the fact that all of the
required courses are completed by the end of the first year at most law
schools. The result is that students end up with legal knowledge of
areas in which they are never going to practice, paid for by their
eventual customers. It is interesting to note that for any other service
we do not demand the best, but rather simply the competent. We do
not need the best plumbers, taxi cab drivers, school teachers,
paramedics or lawyers; we need what is good enough from a societal
perspective, not from the legal profession’s perspective. In addition, in
light of the fact that in Quebec one can enter law school after a mere
two years in CEGEP,117 either Quebec’s standards are far too low, or
the rest of Canada’s are far too high. In light of the access to justice
problem in Canada, the latter seems far more plausible. Finally, this is
also true of the requirements for the bar admission course, which vary
from ten weeks in British Columbia to a year in Alberta.118 The
Competition Bureau’s excellent work on this matter is especially
pertinent in this respect: “the FLSC did not provide the Bureau with a
rationale for the dissimilarities across the country. Furthermore, given
the National Mobility Agreement (see below), which allows lawyers
to move freely among jurisdictions regardless of the legal training
course or articling period required by their home jurisdictions, the
reason for the discrepancies is not apparent.”119

2. FACILITATE MOBILITY AMONG LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN
CANADA
The National Mobility Agreement (NMA), which has been
implemented by all provinces (except Quebec) allows for lawyers to
temporarily practice outside of the province in which they are a
member of the Bar. However, restrictions on permanently practicing
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in that province are still great. The law societies should attempt to
facilitate mobility among legal professionals so that they are best able
to respond to changes in demand which will ensure an efficient
allocation of legal service providers among jurisdictions and thereby
enhance service and increase access to justice. In particular, the
territories should sign the NMA.120
The law societies should attempt to facilitate legal work by
foreign lawyers by removing the restrictions that currently prevent
foreign lawyers from practicing as foreign legal consultants. For
example, the law societies should consider removing the requirement
that foreign legal consultants have residency in the province in which
they are offering advice.121 Increasing mobility promotes competition
and is in keeping with broader international trends. For example, the
European Union has been a concerted effort to eliminate such barriers
in the legal profession, as well as other fields.122

3. ALLOW FOR THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO LAWYERS
Lawyers licensed by their respective law societies are the only
ones who are permitted to supply continuing legal advice in Canada.
The rationale for this should be familiar: to increase the quality of
legal services. This is likely true, but it also restricts the supply of legal
advice and increases the salaries of lawyers, thereby reducing access to
counsel. 123 As recommended by the Competition Bureau, law societies
should not prohibit related service providers—such as paralegals—
from performing legal tasks except in instances where there is very
strong evidence to suggest that to do so would result in harm to the
public. 124
The arguments against the greater use of paralegals amount to
the familiar worry over the likely reduction in the quality of legal
services. This objection is not convincing. Consumers who wish to use
the service of lawyers may do so, while those who wish to use the
120
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services of paralegals may do so. It is already evident whether or not
someone is a lawyer or a paralegal and the choice of the appropriate
balance between the quality of the service and the price of that
service should be left to the consumer, rather than to the law
societies. In sum, the extent of market entry barriers have been
demonstrated to be very beneficial to lawyer’s salaries. The same
cannot be said of the public interest.125

B. REDUCE MARKET-CONDUCT RESTRICTIONS
Market conduct restrictions have been erected to combat the moral
hazard problems stemming from the informational asymmetry
between lawyers and their clients. These restrictions ensure that those
in the legal profession conduct themselves in the interests of the
public at large. The moral hazard problem stems from an exploitation
of the information asymmetry problem by lawyers, which to some
extent could be addressed through greater emphasis on ethical
education for law students. Regardless, the current restrictions
employed by the law societies of Canada impede access to counsel
with no resulting benefit to consumers and therefore should be
removed.

1. REMOVE SUGGESTED OR MANDATORY FEES FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES
British Columbia and New Brunswick set a maximum
percentage to which lawyers are entitled under contingency fee
agreements. This may be done to prevent the moral hazard problem of
lawyers providing higher quality services, at higher cost, than is
required by their client.126 Unfortunately, this measure also directly
impedes access to counsel by preventing those clients with ‘riskier’
cases from having access to a lawyer since lawyers may be unwilling
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to take on more risky cases127 unless the contingency fee is
commensurate with the amount of risk. The necessity of the British
Columbia and New Brunswick measures is dubious in light of the fact
that every other province feels that this restriction is unnecessary.128
These measures also diminish access to justice by reducing price
competition as prices effectively converge on the maximum price.129 A
much better solution to the potential for moral hazard would be to
publish survey data of average prices.130

2. REMOVE ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS
Many of the law societies prohibit comparative advertising
based on price, impose limits on the size, style and content of
advertisements, and restrict the ability of professionals to advertise as
specialists or experts in a certain field of law.131 Presumably these
restrictions are in place to protect consumers from misleading or false
advertising. Regrettably, these actions are superfluous given that
misleading and false advertising is already prohibited under The
Competition Act.132 More importantly the restrictions impair access to
counsel by increasing lawyers’ fees at the expense of the public133by
way of preventing prospective consumers from having access to
pertinent information about the prices and types of services available.
The restrictions that are currently employed—purportedly in the
interests of preventing the consumer from the harmful effects of
information asymmetry problems—seem primarily to exacerbate
information asymmetries and have the undesirable consequence of
lessening access to counsel.
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3. REMOVE SOME OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS STRUCTURE
With the exception of Quebec and Ontario, multi-disciplinary
law practices are effectively prohibited in Canada by virtue of the
prohibition on others sharing in legal fees.134 The potential that a
client’s bill may act as a cross-subsidy for another aspect of a multidisciplinary practice, or that there may be a conflict of interest within
a multi-disciplinary practice, is a legitimate worry. However, such a
worry is likely outweighed by the fact that such organizations have
proven to be successful in Ontario and Quebec. A multi-disciplinary
practice can help law firms raise equity and invest in capital that is of
benefit to the consumer.135 Furthermore, such a practice creates
economies of scope136 which can result in substantial cost savings for
consumers137 and can thereby increase access to counsel. The
Clementi report urged that the UK consider removing many of the
restrictions on alternative business practices.138 The UK government
broadly accepted the recommendations in the Clementi report139 and
recently passed the Legal Services Bill.140In light of the severity of the
current access to justice problem, it seems likely that the balance
struck in Canada is not in the best interests of the public.
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C. INCREASE THE USE OF EXISTING MEANS
This paper has proposed that the current lack of access to
counsel is unacceptable and that fundamental reforms in the way the
law is delivered to citizens would likely increase access to counsel.
However, there is also substantial scope for increasing the use of
existing means that have been shown to increase individuals’ access to
counsel.

1. CONTINGENCY FEES
This paper has addressed the point that maximum limits on
fees lawyers may charge to clients likely impedes access to counsel by
preventing lawyers from taking on cases that they may have taken on
if the contingency fee was commensurate with the risk that they
faced. This subsection makes a slightly different point: that
contingency fees increase access to counsel by providing low incomeclients with access to counsel that they would not otherwise receive.
This benefit is enormous and, as such, the use of contingency fees is to
be greatly encouraged. Further, contingency fees address the moral
hazard problem by ensuring that a prudent lawyer will no longer
pursue a case when the costs outweigh the benefits since the lawyer’s
fee derives from the potential award to the plaintiff.141

2. ADR/SETTLEMENT
In light of the fact that between 92% and 98% of lawsuits
settle, there is substantial scope for improving access to justice
through the use of mediators. Mediators need not be lawyers143 and, as
such, need not cost as much as lawyers. While the use of mediation
fails to enhance access to counsel, this objection to the use of
mediators is not a death knell; access to counsel is itself a means
towards access to justice rather than an end in and of itself. To be
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clear: if there is a more fruitful way of achieving justice, then that
path should be pursued. When parties settle they mitigate numerous
direct costs in terms of their time, money, disrupted lives, and
emotional and psychological energy that would have been expended
in a full-fledged court case. They also mitigate many of the indirect
opportunity costs that stem from having to use their time at court
rather than in another manner.144
The main attraction of settlement is that it can allow for
‘pareto-efficient’ results, wherein both parties are made as well off as
they can be.145 Settlement functions in a more humane way. More
attention is paid to the interests of those involved in the dispute and
allows the disputants to adopt innovative solutions146 beyond those
normally issued by a court but that nonetheless satisfy both parties to
a greater extent than a court ruling might.147 Settlement also allows for
parties to come to a better understanding of each other148 and can
thereby help clear up disputes premised on a failure to a communicate
or misattributions.149 Perhaps most importantly, settlement can ensure
that disputes that are primarily resource-based, rather than rooted in
principle, do not proceed to lengthy litigation.
Unfortunately, ADR and settlement, rather than promoting
access to justice, can actually deny access and dilute justice. ADR and
settlement, when they have become the only realistically affordable
option for parties, preclude access to the courts and thereby deny
parties the opportunity to have their dispute ruled on by a judge. In
effect, access itself is denied because there is no choice in how to
proceed. Financial considerations prevent access to the courts.
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Alternatively, to the extent that access to ‘justice’ of a sort is
granted, it is a diluted form of justice. As Owen Fiss has pointed out,
“(t)o settle for something means to accept less than some ideal.”150 In
this sense, ADR and settlement are far from ideal since, as this paper
has previously made clear, the law should not arbitrate and enforce
private interests but rather should uphold people’s rights. In law,
someone either has a right or does not, and the other party either has
offended that right or has not. There is no reason why those who have
offended should be punished more or less than they deserve, nor that
those who have been harmed should be compensated by the offender
by more or less than they deserve. Each should be punished or
compensated according to what the law requires. This is the
imperative of justice and the rule of law, and also makes a peaceful
democracy possible.
In addition, the law is publicly created and uses public
resources and so should not be used solely for private purposes
without regard to societal interests. Owen Fiss notes that
“adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen
by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the
public participates.”151 He goes on to imply that these officials have a
duty ”not to maximize the ends of private parties...but to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
constitution and statutes....”152 Professor Farrow expands this view by
stating that a democratic society requires a justice system, not a
private system of dispute settlement.153 Therefore, once the
imperatives of justice are taken into account, it is obvious that
settlement, while it may sometimes be ‘pareto-efficient’ for the
particular members involved, is not pareto-efficient for society at
large.
Similarly then, settlement is not ‘pareto-efficient’ for society
at large because, as Professor Farrow notes, the rule of law and justice
is integral to a democratic society.154 Yet settlement, by virtue of
150
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having no precedent value,155 precludes the evolution of the common
law156 and thereby diminishes the extent to which the rule of law
governs our affairs. Yet the rule of law is integral to most notions of a
democracy and was laid out as such in Reference Re Secession of
Quebec.157 It is not convincing for proponents of settlement to point
out that most settlements do not involve questions that would be
likely to bring about a change in the law; it is logically impossible to
know which case with which set of facts and circumstances will bring
about a major change in law.
Settlement would lose much of its appeal were it possible for
access to justice to be truly secured. Therefore, if the law societies and
governments refuse to adopt any of the other recommendations put
forth in this paper then ADR and settlement should be encouraged.
However, the main mechanism to promote access to justice is the
courts. Such access to the courts requires access to counsel and
necessitates that measures be taken that enhance access and preserve
justice. Those measures have been the subject of previous sections of
this paper as well as the sections that follow.

VI
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENHANCE ACCESS TO COUNSEL:
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. REMOVE TAXES ON LEGAL SERVICES
Cameron Murphy discusses tax deductibility as a way of
securing greater access to justice.158 He considers removing the tax
deductibility of legal fees across the board, or allowing individuals to
deduct taxes so as to put them on par with corporations.
It should be noted that taxes makes it possible to have access
to justice in the first place, by making it possible to have courts,
judges, and so forth. So getting rid of a tax on legal services generally
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is merely a displacement of where people are taxed since, unless
services are cut, the tax will have to be made up for elsewhere.
However, a specific tax when one has to use legal services, as opposed
to a general tax imposed on everyone, seriously limits access to justice
by making it that much more expensive. Indeed, in the case of
Christie this additional tax rendered him insolvent and unable to offer
his services to his clients.

B. INCREASE FUNDING OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The state should increase funding to the legal system. Firstly,
in light of the illusory distinction between positive and negative rights
and the importance of many positive rights, it is important that legal
aid be expanded beyond its current parameters.159 At a minimum,
legal aid should be restored to its previous levels to address the
increase in unrepresented litigants.160 Secondly, general taxes should
be raised to allow for more courts and judges which will reduce
waiting times and thereby increase access to justice.

C. SIMPLIFY COURT PROCEDURES
The government of Ontario should be commended for its
efforts to simplify the legal system. In order to simplify the system
without decreasing quality, the Ontario government commissioned a
report on civil justice reform, recently completed by the Honourable
Coulter A. Osborne, which contains many excellent recommendations
on how to streamline judicial procedure.161 For example, the
Honourable Coulter Osborne recommended that time limits be
imposed on pre-trial discovery hearings and that litigation budgets be
set.
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D. ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT BODY SEPARATE FROM THE LAW
SOCIETY TO REGULATE PARALEGALS
In Ontario, paralegals are regulated under the Law Society Act
by the Law Society of Upper Canada.162 The rationale for the
regulation of paralegals is to prevent individuals from being taken
advantage of by paralegals especially because the service offered is a
credence good. The rationale for the regulation to be conducted by
the Law Society is due to the fact that the Law Society is best
equipped to assess the competency of prospective paralegals, since it is
the expert body already charged with ensuring the quality of legal
professionals. Unfortunately, this establishes a startlingly troubling
conflict of interest between the interests of the Law Society of Upper
Canada and paralegals. The Law Society has an obvious interest in
restricting the scope of the paralegal practice. A professional group
should never be regulated by its potential and, in some cases, direct
competitors. Given the fact that the Law Society guards its selfregulating power on the basis that lawyers must remain independent
from the government in order to ensure the integrity of the justice
system—if lawyers were regulated by the government the conflict of
interest would be too great—it is surprising that the Law Society fails
to appreciate the parallel argument with respect to the danger of
paralegals being regulated by the Law Society. Paralegals should be
regulated, but they should be regulated by an independent body
separate from the law society. This prescription applies to jurisdictions
other than Ontario as well.

E. Establish No-Fault/No-Tort Accident Compensation
Insurance
A no-tort accident compensation scheme for personal injuries
would diminish the severity of the access to counsel problem. Such a
scheme, as seen in New Zealand, delivers better on the three goals of
the tort system: deterrence, compensation and justice. By delivering
superior compensation and justice, as well as equally good deterrence
as compared to their previous tort system, the implementation of a
system similar to that found in New Zealand could greatly reduce the
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pressure on the justice system and allow more access to more needy
claimants.
Firstly, tort law has a negligible deterrent effect. The poor
performance of negligence torts to deter is theoretically sound.
Tortfeasors who were negligent do not foresee a possibility that their
conduct could cause harm and persist in spite of that possibility as is
true for reckless behaviour, rather, they simply “ought to have
known” that their behaviour could cause.163 The empirical evidence of
the deterrence of negligence is at best equivocal, as was conceded by
Klar despite his spirited defence of tort law.164 In fact after New
Zealand replaced their tort system with a no-fault accident
compensation scheme there was no increase in the rate of accidents;
motor vehicle accidents actually decreased.165 Further, even if tort law
does have a deterrent effect, this role can be filled by other existing
mechanisms, such as regulatory controls, professional conduct codes,
penal and quasi-penal sanctions, and more effective penalty rating of
insurance premiums.166
Most importantly, tort law fails to compensate people
adequately; no-fault accident compensation compensates people to a
much greater extent. Tort law, according to the Slater report,167
affords no compensation to one-half to two-thirds (or 50%-66%) of
injuries, is subject to enormous delay, is extremely inefficient by
virtue of the transaction costs (court fees, administrative fees, legal
fees) that use more than 50 cents of every dollar, as compared to 80 to
90 cents of every dollar going to victims under no-fault, and is akin to
a lottery in that one’s injury must pass a series of tests, the results of
which are not predictable. Klar disputed Slater’s contention that tort
law was cost-ineffective, claiming that transaction costs only account
Non-negligence (i.e. intentional) torts are subject to criminal penalties that likely
have greater deterrence than civil damages would.
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for 35.3% of expenses.168 Regardless, this percentage is still high
compared to New Zealand’s administrative costs of 7% and ignores
the fact that those who go uncompensated by tort law are entitled to
no compensation whatsoever. 169 By contrast, as Palmer notes, New
Zealand’s scheme offers comprehensive coverage at low cost by
eliminating waste. Palmer notes that, in the realm of medical
malpractice in the United States, only 2 per cent of injured patients
receive compensation with only half of the funds awarded actually
going to the victims.170
Finally, it is argued that tort law better delivers justice. Some
academics argue that tort law better reflects people’s view of justice by
ensuring that, in the words of Klar, there is “some individual
responsibility for individual actions, at least in a humanely modified
form,” and that this “is central to what reasonable people regard as
just.” This view is inaccurate and unfortunate. Firstly, many torts are
already covered by some form of insurance which renders the
corrective justice argument moot. Secondly, even if the tortfeasor does
not have insurance, and is paying out-of-pocket, then corrective
justice is still not achieved since the severity of the penalty enacted
upon the tortfeasor is entirely contingent upon their financial
situation rather than the wrongfulness of their act. Thirdly, the
severity of the penalty is also contingent upon chance rather than the
guilt of the tortfeasor, since a tortfeasor found guilty of negligence
could end up causing a great deal of injury, very little injury or no
injury depending upon chance. This means that the tortfeasor is made
to pay primarily in proportion to chance rather than their own
wrongdoing. Fourthly, the tortfeasor can be made to pay in no-tort
schemes in any case through the use of penalty adjusted insurance
premiums as well as quasi-penal, penal and regulatory measures.
Moreover, the justness of corrective justice itself is debatable. The
reason for why this is the case stems from the nature of negligence
itself. Tort law makes the negligent tortfeasor pay since, as between
an innocent person and a careless tortfeasor, a careless tortfeasor
Klar, “No-Fault” supra note 164; Ontario, “Slater Report”, supra note 162 at301314, 306-7.
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should have to pay. However, carelessness is something that everyone
is susceptible to, as Feldthusen notes.171 Someone who is negligent is
not necessarily a terrible person. This factor, when considered in
combination with the fact that tort damages can be more adversely
punitive than a criminal sentence despite requiring a much lower
standard of mens rea, means that tort law can sometimes be overly
onerous on a tortfeasor. Most importantly, privileging corrective
justice over compensation does not seem particularly just to the
“statistically inevitable victims of injury” who are uncompensated.172
It is evident that only those few who knew they were very
likely to win a very large settlement benefit from tort law. These
people are extremely rare. It is far more rational to prefer the no-tort
compensation scheme since it is far more likely that one will be better
served by such a system. It is this pre-accident perspective that must
be the basis of informed policy choices173and not the post-accident
perspective.
It is also quite important that no-fault compensation
eliminates the need for the use of race-based and genderedstatistics.174 In tort law the defendant is not required to fix societal
injustices, but only to put the plaintiff in the position that he or she
would have been in but for the accident. Therefore, when calculating
damages, judges rely on gendered and race-based statistics to calculate
damages.175 Unfortunately, this practice treats people differently
through no fault of their own but simply by virtue of their race or sex.
It literally amounts to saying that one sex or race is worth more than
one or the other, which is against the principles of human dignity,
equality, and justice. Conversely, a no-tort accident compensation
scheme, drawing as it does upon collective revenues would
compensate individuals equally for identical injuries. It thereby fulfills
the promise of all advanced, civilized societies: treating each and
every member with the respect and dignity that they deserve
171
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regardless of their race or gender, and fairly compensating and caring
for those subjected to misfortune.

F. PROVIDE LITIGATION INSURANCE
Access to justice is such a problem that Justice Gomery
described the current trajectory as “suicidal”, while Chief Justice
McLachlin has repeatedly decried the sorry state of affairs.176 The goal
of a civil litigation scheme would be to insure all individuals against
the risk of law suits being brought against them and insure all
individuals against the risk of having to use legal means to redress
grievances. Therefore, funds would be provided to individuals to
either defend a claim or mount a claim in the event that this risk
transpires. The appropriate methods to ensure that people do not
make excessive use of such an insurance scheme is a matter of detail
that remains to be worked out, but could include limits on the
number of claims an individual may make. This proposal is not
optimal since it would bar people from being able to make legitimate
claims if they had exceeded their quota. The reality is that most
people make highly infrequent use of the legal system, so the
likelihood of barring such claims is low. It is also true that ensuring a
person for a few claims is better than not insuring anyone against any
claims at all, as is the case currently.
The goal of civil litigation insurance is to ensure all
individuals against risk. Risk, is not something that can be managed
alone and, as such, gives rise to the need for insurance. Most people do
not have legal insurance, hoping that they do not need it. Some people
save for contingencies of this sort, but it is difficult to determine how
much money to save, since an individual simply does not know if they
will need to make use of the legal system or not. Fortunately, if the
aforementioned individual were to seek insurance with a group of
other individuals (a process known as risk-pooling) then the problem
would be mitigated because of the law of large numbers. The law of
large numbers states that as you average together more and more
numbers in a certain range, the average becomes more and more
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stable. This is why the CAW has purchased group litigation insurance,
and the results so far, have been positive.177
One strong objection to this proposal is that it is not obvious
why such an insurance scheme must be required. The answer lies in
the fact that people tend to discount their future. In essence, when
the benefits of a proposal are far in the future, people tend to opt for
smaller rewards in the present rather than larger rewards in the
future. It is for this reason that people do not save enough, smoke too
much and do not exercise enough. It is also for this reason that it is
mandatory that people purchase health insurance through the
government.
It could then be objected that there is no reason for the
government to provide this insurance rather than the private sector.
After all, automobile insurance is also mandatory, yet it is provided by
the private sector. Given that very little litigation insurance is
provided at present it seems likely that this is an area of market failure
ripe for public provision. If not, then insurance can be purchased
through the private sector. What is important is that litigation be
insured, because it is far too expensive to attempt to deal with the risk
once it occurs. This proposal would increase access to counsel
immeasurably. It may be difficult to get such a proposal passed, and it
will take extensive study and strong resistance to established interests,
but such was the same battle faced by every province in Canada
before health insurance was implemented.178

G. REQUIRE LAW SOCIETIES TO REFORM OR RISK LOSING THEIR
SELF-GOVERNING POWER
While it is clear that lawyers should be regulated and should
be independent from the government, it is less clear why lawyers
should be left to govern themselves. It is not necessary for lawyers to
self-regulate in order to maintain their independence from the
government. This could just as easily have been achieved by
Wydrzynski, Hildebrandt, & Blonde, “The CAW Prepaid Legal Services Plan: A
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conferring regulatory power over lawyers to an independent thirdparty. Placing the suppliers of a service in the position of regulators of
the supply of that service renders the law societies in a position akin
to that of OPEC, where the suppliers of a service are also its
regulators. In other words, the self-regulating power of the law
societies effectively places lawyers in the position of members of a
cartel.179 While the profession itself is in the best position to know
what regulations would be in the public interest, the mere fact that
the profession has knowledge of the public interest does not imply
that actions will be taken in the public interest. 180 In light of the
theoretical conflict of interest between the profession’s mandate to
regulate in the public interest and its ability to engage in cartel-like
behaviour, as well as the previously examined empirical results
showing that the profession has engaged in regulation to the
detriment of the public interest, it is manifestly evident that the law
societies must undertake fundamental reforms to improve access to
counsel. If not, the governments of the various provinces and
territories of Canada should seize (by way of statute) the regulatory
powers of their respective law societies. Adding to what has
previously been said regarding the importance of the right to counsel
in a modern democracy, Philip Slayton drives the point home stating
that: “It is a scandal that most Canadians lack recourse to the law and
the legal system, a vital part of government, because they cannot
afford to pay legal fees. It is as if the right to vote in a general election
were only given to those with an income above a certain level.”181 The
Clementi report, largely enacted through the Legal Services Bill,
recommends removing self-governing power from the law societies
and providing that power to an independent regulator, the Legal
Services Board, chaired by a lay-member.182 Admittedly, in England
the body that represented the legal profession was also the one that
was supposed to regulate it, in which case there was a more obvious
conflict of interest there than in Canada where the Canadian Bar
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Association fulfills the former function.183 However, while these
organizations may be different in name, they have not acted
differently in practice.

VII
FUTURE RESEARCH
While this paper has attempted to detail some of the
numerous methods available to increase access to counsel it has not
focused on the effectiveness of the plain language movement and
access to free legal information in terms of facilitating that transition.
The failure to use plain language and provide free legal information
restricts the understanding of the law by the populace184and thereby
increases the severity of the lack of access to counsel problem.185
Unfortunately, this complaint is not novel. Lawyers engage in debates
of interpretation, such that difficulty in understanding the law may be
inherent to the law itself. The effectiveness of facilitating greater use
of plain language and providing more free legal information are topics
beyond the scope of this paper, but, to the extent that it is possible,
would appear to reduce the severity of the access to counsel problem.
Secondly, if either access to counsel is taken more seriously, or
the prescribed incentivizing effects detailed throughout the rest of
this paper do increase access to counsel, the increased demand for
counsel will have to be met. As such it should seriously be considered
whether or not increasing law school entrance class sizes will be
necessary to address the needs of the Canadian population. Further,
increasing the number of students admitted to law school in the first
place may help mitigate the access to counsel problem since an
increased supply decreases cost.186 While law schools take the best
students, it does not necessarily follow that the depths of the possible
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entrants who could do a perfectly competent job have been reached.
This view is leant credence by the per capita enrolment rate variation
across provinces. The proper balance between ensuring a sufficient
number of future lawyers and maintaining a quality pool of students
in law school should be struck and is an area ripe for future research.
Finally, it has been beyond the scope of this paper to assess
what the optimal combination of the aforementioned prescriptions
ought to be. As a result, this is an area that would benefit greatly from
future research.

VIII
CONCLUSION
The importance of access to counsel in terms securing access
to justice necessitates fundamental reform by the governments and
law societies in order to promote access to counsel. This is evident
from the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie, which,
when supplemented by the other arguments advanced in this paper,
establish the importance of the right to counsel as a matter of policy,
such that the law societies and the governments of Canada must do
more to promote access to counsel.
Building upon the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in
Christie, this paper has argued, firstly, that the right to counsel is an
integral part of access to justice, which in turn is integral to the rule of
law. This view is reinforced by a consultation with Dyzenhaus’s
publicity condition of the rule of law. To deny that access to counsel
does not form part of the rule of law is tantamount to denying the
public character of the law and the nature of the adversarial system
which presupposes a right to counsel. Further, it relies upon a faulty
distinction both between the process and substance of law and
between positive and negative rights. Secondly, in addition to access
to counsel forming part of the rule of law, it is also a constitutional
right in itself, as is apparent from BCGEU and sections 7 and 15 of the
Charter.
Even if this paper has failed to demonstrate that access to
counsel is a constitutional right either by virtue of being inherent in
the notion of the rule of law or being a constitutional right by itself,
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the force of these arguments should be sufficient to demonstrate
that—on policy grounds—access to counsel ought to be secured.
Access to counsel should be promoted by the law societies and the
government of Canada.
The law societies ought to reduce market-entry barriers by
decreasing the duration of legal training, facilitating mobility among
legal professionals and allowing for the use of alternatives to lawyers.
Market-conduct restrictions ought to be removed as well, such as
those on mandatory fees, advertising, and business structure. The use
of contingency fees and ADR should, in certain circumstances, be
promoted as well.
The governments of Canada should promote access to counsel
by removing taxes on legal services, increasing the funding of the legal
system, simplifying court procedures, and establishing an independent
body separate from the law societies to regulate paralegals. Further,
litigation insurance ought to be implemented in addition to a nofault/no-tort accident compensation insurance scheme. Finally, a
systemic failure on the part of the law societies to implement the
suggested reforms should jeopardize the ability of the law societies to
retain their self-governing power, which has been vested in them
only insofar as they advance the public interest.
It has been beyond the scope of this paper to assess the degree
to which public legal information, pro bono work, and the plain
language movement ought to be enhanced, though the case for these
initiatives seems evident. In addition, the expansion of enrolment in
law schools seems like a fruitful means through which access to
counsel can be promoted. This paper has focused on objective,
financial barriers to access to justice. Ensuring access to counsel is just
the beginning of improving access to justice. Future initiatives to
promote access to justice should seek to reduce educational barriers,
physical barriers, and subjective barriers such as those stemming from
language, culture, power, history, and systemic discrimination.
Finally, the end goal of access to justice is much broader in ambition:
to achieve substantive justice in terms of outcomes. In this light,
access to counsel is a modest goal, but one whose urgency demands
attention and the reforms prescribed.

85

